| Cold War Confrontations: Asia, Latin America, and Europe and Beginning Détente (1961-1972) |
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Sections:- Advice from Eisenhower
- The Berlin Crisis
- The Berlin Crisis: The Vienna Conference
- The Berlin Crisis: Mounting Tensions
- The Berlin Crisis: The Wall
- Vietnam: The Kennedy Administration
- Vietnam: The Johnson Administration
- Vietnam: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
- Vietnam: The Tet Offensive
- The Sino-Soviet Split
- The Sino-Soviet Split: Chinese and Soviet Exchanges
- The Sino-Soviet Split: Border Clashes
- Beginning Detente
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| Historical Context
The following module outlines the major Cold War confrontations of the 1960's. It should be noted that for the sake of chronology, the sections are divided accordingly. However, the 1960's saw many simultaneous confrontations occur; thus, the sections below often overlap in years.
The following speech was given just three days before the end of Eisenhower's presidential term. Significant are his warnings concerning the growing military-industrial complex. The speech also lays the foundation for the upcoming decade brimming with Cold War confrontations. Of special note are his rather blatant omissions. While Eisenhower is clearly referring to the U.S.S.R, and communism in general in his speech, he does not actually name them, yet warns his successor, John F. Kennedy of the perceived challenges these foes to Western freedom would likely bring.
Attached Document:
Included here is the text of Eisenhower's address.
Questions to consider:
1)Did John F. Kennedy heed Eisenhower's advice? How or how not?
2)How does Eisenhower's address reflect his administration's views on the perceived communist threat? |
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| Historical Context
The crisis over Berlin was years in the making by the time John F. Kennedy took the White House in 1961. The conflict, which saw East Germany's Walter Ulbricht and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev pitted against West Germany's Konrad Adenaur and Kennedy, concerned the labor drain between East and West Berlin. This drain found thousands of laborers defecting from East Berlin to West Berlin, which had enjoyed political and economic assistance from the United States since the end of World War II. These defections caused major strain on East Germany's crippled economy. Thus, the U.S.S.R wanted Western, particularly American interests out of West Berlin in order to deter the migration and strengthen the Communist bloc. The Vienna Summit of June 3-4, 1961 found Kennedy and Khrushchev at odds over the conceived plan. |
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| Historical Context
The following interview of Walt Rostow, the deputy to Kennedy's National Security Assistant, McGeorge Bundy, describes the contentious Vienna Summit. The interview also sheds light on Kennedy's reaction to his first and last meeting with Khrushchev. Also included is a photograph of Kennedy and Khrushchev at the Vienna Summit.
Attached Document:
Included here is the Rostow interview.
Questions to consider:
1) What was the significance of the Vienna Conference?
2) What is the tone of Rostow's interview?
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| Historical Context
Tensions mounted following the failed Vienna Summit. By July of that year, Kennedy knew he had to issue a statement concerning the situation. Thus, the President addressed the United States on the Berlin Crisis on July 25, 1961 His speech is optimistic, yet firm. The outcry that resulted from his address will be discussed below.
Kennedy's speech deeply effected Khrushchev. In response, Khrushchev made an address of his own. Of special consideration is Khrushchev's tone of defiance over Kennedy's remarks and the perceived American course of action concerning Berlin.
Attached Document:
Included here are both Kennedy's and Krushchev's speeches.
Questions to consider:
1) Do you think Kennedy was right to give his speech?
2) Discuss Krushchev's reaction to Kennedy's speech. Was it justified? Why or why not?
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| Historical Context
With dangerously mounting tensions, Khrushchev and Ulbricht ultimately conceived of a plan which would avoid a costly conflict with the West. The two devised a plan for a the erection of a barrier that would separate East and West Berlin in order to stem the influx of migration. The erection of the wall began on August 13, 1961, with the United States opting not to act out in aggression against the actions of the U.S.S.R. Below are several photographs of the major players in the Berlin Crisis, including Ulbricht and Adenaur. Also included is a photograph of the erection of the Berlin Wall and the wall after its completion, with both photographs found on the same provided link.
Questions to consider:
1)Kennedy's reaction to the Berlin Crisis has been perceived by some to be a failure in that ultimately the Communists succeeded in ridding East Germany of Western influence. Proponents of Kennedy's policies argue that a costly war was ultimately avoided, thus Kennedy was victorious. Consider both arguments.
2)Consider Khrushchev's 1961 speech responding to Kennedy's speech. In what ways did Khrushchev rally those within the Soviet bloc to his views on Berlin?
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| Historical Context
The perceived threat of communism had an unmatched influence on American foreign policy in the 1960's. Such was the case in Vietnam in the 1960's, as President John F. Kennedy was determined to push forth the American policy of the containment of communism. In doing so, Kennedy pledged American support of South Vietnam. What began as financial assistance soon escalated into military conflict involving American troops. In the following memorandum dated November 14, 1961, Kennedy comments to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on the logistics of sending troops to Vietnam.
As tensions flared, American support of South Vietnam increased. In the following letter dated December 14 1961 from Kennedy to South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem, Kennedy promises to continue their assistance to South Vietnam. The letter is filled with anti-communist sentiment and serves as an example of the American desire to contain the communist threat that resonated throughout the 1960's.
As the conflict in Vietnam escalated, the U.S. stayed her course. As evidenced by the following documents, Kennedy was unwilling to back down or sacrifice America's commitment to the cause. The first document, a statement made in August of 1963 by Theodore Heavner, the Department of State's Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group, provides four main points concerning American policy in the Far East. The second document is a White House statement issued in October of 1963 which seems to display a certain degree of optimism concerning American progress in Vietnam.
Attached Document:
Included here are several documents from the Kennedy Administration regarding the situation in Vietnam.
Questions to consider:
1) Discuss Kennedy's sentiment concerning tensions in Vietnam. Does optimism appear to be justified?
2) Why was Kennedy so intent on containing communism in Vietnam? |
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| Historical Context
The assassination of Kennedy ushered in the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. Strong in his convictions, Johnson relied heavily on the word of Kennedy's advisors, particularly the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. In March of 1964, McNamara issued a statement concerning Vietnam in which he pushes for more military involvement and a continuation of Kennedy's policies.
Attached Document:
Included here is McNamara's statement on Vietnam.
Questions to consider:
1) Why do you think McNamara insisted on going forward with Kennedy's plans in Vietnam?
2) Discuss the implications of a President relying to heavily on the opinions of advisors.
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| Historical Context
Despite the optimism provided by U.S. policy makers, disaster occurred in early August of 1964. Two American destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese gunboats; the attack caught the U.S. by surprise and Johnson did not take the attack lightly. The following documents are the result of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The first is Johnson's address to Congress in which he requests that more money and troops be invested in the fight against North Vietnamese communism. The second document is the Congressional Resolution granting Johnson his request.
The years following the Gulf of Tonkin incident saw a huge increase in American casualties in Vietnam. Public opinion was quite negative concerning the war and Johnson's approval ratings were plummeting. Below are graphs indicating both the escalation of troops from 1965-1968 and the American casualties from the same years.
Attached Document:
Included here are Johnson's address and the Congressional resolution.
Questions to consider:
1) Was Johnson hasty in increasing involvement in Vietnam? Why or why not?
2) The Gulf of Tonkin incident represents a turning point in American public opinion concerning the war in Vietnam. Compare this shift in attitude to other incidents throughout history.
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| Historical Context
The TET offensive, a concerted effort by the North Vietnamese to attack South Vietnam in order to gain control of the major cities jolted the U.S. away from the optimism provided by the administration and the military. While North Vietnam was ultimately unsuccessful in their goals, the TET offensive was a major turning point in the war in Vietnam, with Americans less and less convinced that fighting a war against communism in Vietnam was advantageous to the U.S. The following is a transcript from a 1968 broadcast by Walter Cronkite. In it he laments the war in Vietnam, referring to it as a "stalemate".
Attached Document:
Included here is the transcript from Cronkite's broadcast following the Tet Offensive.
Questions to consider:
1)For their insistence in containing communism, should the war in Vietnam be viewed as a war by proxy with the Soviet Union? Why or why not?
2)Was the optimism displayed by the Johnson administration a detriment to the realities of the conflict in Vietnam? Was an idealistic approach necessary to obtain results? |
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| Historical Context
Tensions between the Soviet Union and China were years in the making by the 1960's. The brands of communism were different with both countries experiencing distaste for the others' interpretations of communist doctrine. The subsequent split between the U.S.S.R and China that resulted can be seen as a major turning point in America's foreign policy. Significant as a precursor to the ushering in of a detente policy in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Sino-Soviet split can be seen as a major Cold War confrontation with far-reaching ramifications.
Provided below is Kennedy's State of the Union address from January of 1963. In the address, the President acknowledges the rift between the Soviets and the Chinese and uses it as an opportunity to push forward anti-communist sentiment.
Attached Document:
Included here is Kennedy's State of the Union Address in 1963.
Questions to consider:
1) What is the tone of Kennedy's State of the Union?
2) In what ways does Kennedy use the Sino-Soviet split to his advantage?
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| Historical Context
In February of 1964, a Chinese newspaper published a commentary on what they coined the Soviet's "revisionist ideology". The commentary is significant in that it demonstrates the level of dissatisfaction felt by the Chinese toward their Soviet counterparts.
A disgruntled Soviet Union saw the rift as a threat to the international communist movement. On a number of occasions, The Soviets accused the Chinese of desiring a split, which would serve as a weakening of communism. For their part, the Chinese were dissatisfied with what they considered to be concessions made by the Soviets to the Western imperialists, namely the United States. China was unhappy with the Soviet treatment of the Berlin crisis and the Cuban Missile crisis, believing the U.S.S.R to be to compliant with the U.S. As a result, China issued in 1964 a letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) stating they would sever their relationship with the U.S.S.R.
Attached Document:
The comments in the Chinese newspaper and China's letter to the Soviet Communist Party are included in this section.
Questions to consider:
1) What are the implications of tension between the Soviets and the Chinese? How was world-wide communism affected?
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| Historical Context
The subsequent years saw an amassing of troops from both sides, on the borders of the Soviet Union and China. Border clashes ensued, reaching a peak in 1969. These border clashes were seen as a major threat not only to the stability of communism, but also as the possibility of a major-power war. Provided below is a Department of State memorandum concerning the Sino-Soviet conflict. Of special consideration is the tone of anxiety felt throughout the document; the U.S. were aware of the dangers a war between the Soviets and the Chinese would pose on the world.
Tensions reached a climax in 1969. However, diplomacy was resumed between the Soviets and the Chinese, as an end to the border clashes was suggested by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin in 1969. In the letter, Enlai denounces the possibility of armed conflict between the two. The letter, while cold in tone, provides an end to the tensions that escalated throughout the 1960's.
Attached Document:
Included here is the Department of State memorandum concerning the Sino-Soviet split.
Questions to consider:
1)In what ways was the Sino-Soviet split advantageous to the United States?
2)Was a split between China and the Soviet Union inevitable? Could it have been avoided? How?
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| Historical Context
Detente, or a relaxing of Cold War tensions, began to be realized in the late 1960's under the new presidency of Richard Nixon. The process was slow, with incremental steps being made to foster relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet split certainly served to usher in the era of detente in that the Soviets were beginning to see advantages to good relations with the West, particularly in the realm of armaments.
Early detente began with the signing of two monumental treaties between the West and the Soviet Union. The first such treaty, signed on January 27, 1967 and put into effect on October 10, 1967 should be examined against the larger backdrop of the scientific breakthroughs that were occurring in the 1960's, particularly space travel. The treaty essentially bars the use of outer space for military purposes, admonishing the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space and declaring celestial bodies, such as the moon, for peaceful use.
The second treaty that ushered in an era of detente was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed on July 1, 1968 and put into effect on March 5, 1970. The treaty served not only as an arms control between the West and the Soviets, it also admonished the free trade of nuclear secrets. Significant for its role in laying the groundwork for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that were to come, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was viewed as both hopeful and advantageous to both the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) lasted from November of 1969 to May of 1972. The talks, which involved diplomats from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R were groundbreaking in the level of cooperation between the two powers. While problems ensued, as are detailed in the following narrative provided by the Bureau of Arms Control, the fact that negotiations were being attempted was encouraging. Also displayed below is a photograph of Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor under Nixon and Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. While relations between Dobrynin and members of presidential administrations had been strained in the past, the relationship between Kissinger and Dobrynin was amicable.
Attached Documents:
Included here are the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the SALT Narrative.
Questions to consider:
1)How did the willingness of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union shed positive light on the U.S?
2)Had internal difficulties not plagued the Soviet Union, would a detente have begun? Consider the implications of a reversal of fortune for the United States.
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